Legitimacy of the Interim Government

When Nobel Peace Prize laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus was appointed as Chief Adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government following the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, he initially enjoyed broad, multi-sectoral support. Student protest leaders, opposition parties (including the BNP and the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami), and even the military high command rallied behind Yunus as a neutral, consensus figure to lead a transitional administration. This broad backing, combined with Yunus’s technocratic reputation as the founder of microfinance giant Grameen Bank, gave the interim government an early veneer of legitimacy despite its extraconstitutional rise to power. However, this goodwill has rapidly eroded. The interim regime’s lack of an electoral mandate has become increasingly problematic as Yunus struggles to build political consensus for significant decisions. Key reforms and decisions have been implemented unilaterally, including sweeping administrative appointments and ordinances, without consultation or parliamentary oversight. Critics argue that Yunus is consolidating power under the guise of reform, rather than fostering an inclusive process. The absence of a clear timetable for new elections has only deepened concerns. What began as a “rescue” administration to stabilise the country is now mired in a legitimacy crisis, with opponents charging that the interim government is overstaying its welcome and operating with an authoritarian streak. Uncertainty over if and when free elections will occur, coupled with economic strains and persistent street protests, underscores the fragile foundation of Yunus’s rule.

Yunus’s International Image vs. Domestic Controversies

Dr. Yunus has long been celebrated abroad as a visionary social entrepreneur and humanitarian. Awarded the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize for pioneering microcredit as a means to alleviate poverty, he has received accolades from world leaders and institutions. This international stature translated into substantial foreign goodwill when he assumed interim leadership. Global figures openly endorsed Yunus’s democratic and reformist intentions; in fact, in 2023 more than 170 world leaders and Nobel laureates – including former U.S. President Barack Obama and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon – penned an open letter defending Yunus and urging Sheikh Hasina to halt what they viewed as politically motivated legal harassments against him. These global appeals reflected Yunus’s image as a principled figure committed to human rights and good governance. Yet within Bangladesh, Yunus’s reputation is far more contentious. His decades-long feud with Hasina’s Awami League government left deep scars. Hasina’s administration, which came to power in 2009, targeted Yunus with investigations and court cases (ostensibly over corruption and labour law issues) that his supporters insist were trumped-up charges aimed at discrediting him. The bad blood dates back to 2007, when Yunus briefly floated the idea of launching his political party during a military-backed caretaker regime—a move that enraged Hasina. Since then, ruling party loyalists painted Yunus as an opportunist and even a traitor to the nation’s political order. Hasina herself publicly denounced Yunus as a “bloodsucker of the poor,” accusing his microfinance ventures of exploiting vulnerable borrowers. Such blistering rhetoric fueled a narrative among nationalist circles that Yunus serves foreign interests and elitist agendas rather than the interests of ordinary Bangladeshis. These domestic controversies have somewhat undermined his standing at home, even as the international community views him as a hero. Upon taking charge of the interim government, Yunus had to navigate this divide between glowing global expectations and the suspicions of a segment of the Bangladeshi public. Conspiracy theories even swirled that Yunus’s elevation was orchestrated by Western powers (with whispers of a CIA hand in his appointment), reflecting the lingering distrust among his detractors. The clash between Yunus’s international image and his domestic critics adds an extra layer of complexity to the interim government’s challenges – he must prove to his people that he is a legitimate, impartial steward of democracy, not just a global icon parachuted into power.

Alleged Alliances with Islamist Factions

One of the most polarising aspects of the current political quagmire is the role of Islamist factions in the anti-Hasina uprising and the interim administration. During the mass protests that led to Hasina’s downfall, hardline Islamist groups seized an opening to reassert themselves. The Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami, long banned from politics for its extremist stances, aligned with the BNP and student demonstrators in agitation against the Awami League government. After Yunus took office, his interim regime controversially relaxed restrictions on Islamist organisations, notably by lifting the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami just weeks after Hasina’s ouster. This move was ostensibly aimed at broadening political inclusion, but it backfired by emboldening radical elements. Almost immediately, there was a spike in religiously motivated violence, including attacks on Hindu minorities, which many attributed to the newly unbridled Jamaat activists. Yunus’s perceived indulgence of Jamaat has badly dented his credibility among secular Bangladeshis, who view the party as fundamentally opposed to the country’s founding principles of secularism and pluralism. In addition to Jamaat, even more extremist networks have shown signs of resurgence under the interim government. Hizb-ut-Tahrir – an Islamist organisation banned since 2009 for advocating the overthrow of elected governments in favour of a transnational caliphate – has brazenly re-emerged in public. In March 2025, Hizb-ut-Tahrir staged a large “March for Khilafat” through central Dhaka, with hundreds of supporters defiantly calling for an Islamic state. The ability of this outlawed group to mobilise openly under Yunus’s watch raised alarm bells at home and in neighbouring countries. Many interpreted it as a symptom that the interim authorities, intentionally or not, have given Islamist radicals greater leeway in exchange for their support against the Awami League. Government spokespeople denied any formal deals with extremist outfits, and security forces did eventually disperse the Hizb-ut-Tahrir rally with tear gas. Nonetheless, the optics of banned Islamist forces gaining ground have undermined public trust. Secular civil society leaders accuse Yunus of striking a Faustian bargain – tolerating or even partnering with reactionary Islamist elements to shore up his regime’s base, at the expense of Bangladesh’s secular fabric. The interim government’s alliance (whether tacit or overt) with Islamist factions like Jamaat-e-Islami is thus a double-edged sword: it may have helped topple an authoritarian government, but it now threatens to unleash sectarian strife and roll back the liberal values many Bangladeshis hold dear.

Reactions of the BNP and Civil Society

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has played an ambivalent role in the Yunus-led interim setup. As the country’s main opposition party was sidelined under Hasina, the BNP initially welcomed Hasina’s removal and supported Yunus’s appointment, seeing it as an opportunity to regain political relevance. Indeed, BNP cadres joined Jamaat and student groups in the mass protests that paved the way for the interim administration. In the early days of Yunus’s tenure, BNP leaders were part of the broad coalition propping up the new order. However, fissures soon emerged between the BNP and the interim government. Tensions escalated when Yunus’s administration took actions that the BNP perceived as undermining their interests. For example, a dispute arose over a long-pending Dhaka mayoral election result: BNP activists accused an interim government adviser of blocking their candidate from assuming a mayoral post he had legally won, fueling BNP street protests against Yunus’s team. More broadly, the BNP has grown frustrated with what it perceives as Yunus’s bias toward the student-led reformist camp, often referred to as the National Citizen Party (NCP). Yunus moved swiftly to ban the Awami League – a key demand of the NCP protesters – without consulting other stakeholders, a decision that worried the BNP. From the BNP’s perspective, the interim government’s harsh measures against their old rival, the AL, were welcome; however, the prospect of the NCP (comprising youthful activists with no electoral base) sharing power or shaping the next elections poses a threat to the BNP’s political future. The BNP has therefore begun to challenge the interim government more openly, demanding a timeline for an election and decrying any favouritism shown to the NCP or other newcomers.

At the same time, elements of civil society that had initially championed Yunus are now voicing disillusionment. The interim government’s authoritarian tendencies – such as curbs on media and public assembly, and a recent ordinance empowering it to dismiss public servants summarily – have prompted outrage from human rights groups, professional associations, and ordinary citizens. In late May 2025, thousands of government employees staged continuous protests in Dhaka against the new ordinance that allows the interim authorities to fire civil servants without due process. Unions and civil society organisations labelled the measure unconstitutional and repressive, accusing Yunus of using draconian powers to purge dissenters and entrench his rule. Furthermore, what was once perceived as Yunus’s strength – his outsider status and lack of party affiliation – is increasingly seen as a political liability. He lacks a natural grassroots constituency, and his rapid reforms have alienated entrenched interest groups. Sections of civil society that expected a participatory transition complain of being excluded from the decision-making process. Roundtable dialogues have given way to rule by decree. This growing widespread anger is evident in the resumption of street agitations not just by the BNP, but also by student groups and civic activists who were once Yunus’s base. The consensus that ushered in the interim government has fractured: too many in both the BNP and civil society now find Yunus’s administration disturbingly similar to the authoritarian regime it replaced, albeit with different actors at the helm.

Geopolitical Implications (U.S., India, China)

Bangladesh’s internal upheaval under the interim government is reverberating across its diplomatic relationships, especially with the United States, India, and China. Each of these powers has significant stakes in Bangladesh and has responded warily to the changing political dynamics. The United States had been a vocal critic of Sheikh Hasina’s later years in office, flagging concerns about authoritarianism, flawed elections, and human rights violations under her rule. Washington, along with international watchdogs, did not consider Bangladesh’s January 2024 elections free or fair, and it imposed visa sanctions on individuals undermining democracy. Thus, the U.S. greeted Hasina’s ouster and Yunus’s elevation with measured optimism, hopeful that Bangladesh might return to a more democratic trajectory under new leadership. Yunus’s rapport with many Western figures and his global reputation provided an opening for improved U.S.-Bangladesh ties. The interim government has indeed tried to court Washington, reportedly exploring new energy deals and technology partnerships (even rolling out Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite internet service) to signal a pro-U.S. orientation. However, America’s patience is not unlimited. U.S. officials have insisted that the interim regime quickly restore democracy through credible elections. As months pass without an election date, concerns mount in D.C. that Yunus’s government could repeat the authoritarian patterns of its predecessor. Any leniency Washington might have afforded due to Yunus’s fame will evaporate if Bangladesh backslides on democratic commitments. Moreover, the geopolitical chessboard complicates matters: Bangladesh is a key arena in the U.S.-China strategic competition. American policymakers are wary that prolonged instability or anti-democratic drift in Dhaka could push Bangladesh further into China’s orbit. Indeed, there are signs of a diplomatic realignment underway. In a bold departure from tradition, Yunus’s first foreign visit as head of government was not to India – Bangladesh’s longtime partner – but to China. In March 2025, he travelled to Beijing and was received with full honours, including an honorary doctorate from Peking University. Yunus declared a “new stage” in the Bangladesh-China relationship, and Chinese officials hailed his visit as the most significant by a Bangladeshi leader in decades. The symbolism was unmistakable: Dhaka appeared to be tilting toward Beijing after years of balancing between the great powers. This pivot has several motivations. China is Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and a major investor in infrastructure; Yunus likely seeks to harness Chinese financing to prop up Bangladesh’s sputtering economy. Additionally, given India’s perceived closeness to Hasina’s fallen government, the new regime in Dhaka may feel it can win legitimacy and leverage by embracing China’s friendship. But the shift comes with risks. India, Bangladesh’s immediate neighbour and traditional ally, is deeply unsettled by recent developments. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has invested in a strong partnership with Hasina, particularly in areas such as security, counterterrorism, and connectivity. Hasina cooperated with India in curbing Islamist militancy and refrained from stoking anti-India nationalism, policies for which Delhi was grateful. Now, India faces an unsettling scenario: an interim administration in Dhaka that includes BNP and Jamaat influence (groups historically less friendly to India), rising Islamist assertiveness on Bangladesh’s streets, and an apparent diplomatic snub as Yunus cosies up to Beijing. Indian officials have maintained a cautious tone publicly, urging stability and inclusion in Bangladesh. For instance, Delhi pointedly called on Yunus’s government to ensure the safety of Bangladesh’s Hindu minority amidst communal unrest. Behind the scenes, however, strategic planners in India worry that Bangladesh, under Yunus, could align more closely with China and Pakistan-leaning elements, thereby eroding India’s influence in South Asia. Bangladesh’s geographic position – nearly encircled by India, and adjacent to the sensitive Bay of Bengal – means any political shift in Dhaka has an outsized impact on Indian security calculations. China, for its part, is keen to capitalise on the opportunity. Beijing has been officially circumspect, issuing standard statements in the hope of achieving “social stability” in Bangladesh. But China undoubtedly sees potential advantage in a post-Hasina landscape. Under Hasina, Bangladesh has skillfully balanced its relations, joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative and purchasing Chinese arms, while maintaining cordial ties with India and the West. Suppose Yunus’s interim government edges away from India and the U.S.. In that case, China stands ready to deepen economic ties and strategic footholds – from ports to power plants – effectively pulling Bangladesh further into its sphere of influence. The U.S., India, and China are therefore watching Bangladesh’s interim experiment with a mix of apprehension and resolve. The United States remains Bangladesh’s largest export market, affording it economic leverage to encourage a democratic course, as evident in recent U.S. tariff and visa policy manoeuvres linking trade benefits to governance issues. India holds the geographic and historical leverage, as any instability in Bangladesh could send refugees and extremists across the 4,000 km Indo-Bangla border. And China offers the interim government a tempting lifeline of funds and political cover, albeit at the cost of strategic dependency. This great-power balancing act adds an external pressure on Yunus’s government: major foreign partners will calibrate their support based on how he navigates democracy at home and alignment abroad. A misstep could see Bangladesh isolated by the West or squeezed by its neighbours, exacerbating the country’s crisis. Conversely, a deft handling might extract economic aid from all sides without alienating any – a tough but not impossible diplomatic dance.

The Path Ahead for Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s interim government, led by Dr. Yunus, stands at a crossroads, its progress hampered by political discord over election timing and even friction with the armed forces. Competing visions for the transition have emerged: opposition parties demand national elections by December 2025, while Yunus and his advisers insist that crucial reforms must be implemented first—pushing any polls to mid-2026—a stance that has even put him at odds with the powerful military, whose chief has signaled support for the earlier timeline. For Yunus, a Nobel laureate tasked with guiding the nation back to democracy, this impasse is deeply challenging. He promised sweeping reforms upon taking office, yet a lack of consensus has stalled progress, and he has hinted at frustration in the face of gridlock. In fact, during a meeting with student leaders, Yunus suggested he “may have to leave” his post if he cannot fulfil his mandate of reform and fair elections amid such pressures, feeling “trapped between demands from different political camps and growing public impatience.” These uncertainties underscore the fragility of the interim administration’s mandate.

At the same time, Yunus’s leadership faces a crisis of public confidence at home. Although internationally he is lauded for pioneering microfinance, domestically he has become a polarising figure, and the entrenched political establishment questions his neutrality and motives. Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina – now in exile – has launched fierce critiques, even branding Yunus a “loan shark” conspiring with foreign powers to ruin the country. Such charged rhetoric from the ousted ruling party signals the depth of scepticism among segments of the population. Seeking clarification and validation, can the people of Bangladesh bestow their inherent trust on The Loan Shark Doctorate?

The coming months will be critical. A best-case scenario would see Yunus steering a course toward credible elections—balancing reform with inclusion, and neutralizing extremist threats. That would require rebuilding trust among bitter rivals and possibly rethinking the ban on the Awami League to let the people ultimately decide its fate. Conversely, the worst-case scenario would be a downward spiral into authoritarianism under a different guise—either a prolonged one-party dominance by those now in power, or chaos that invites military rule, or an Islamist-influenced state that rolls back minority rights and social progress.

Ultimately, the fate of Bangladesh’s interim government and its quagmire will hinge on whether Yunus and his coalition can resist the temptations of power and fulfil their promise of a new start. The coming months are critical. If Yunus successfully navigates toward credible elections—balancing reform with inclusion, and neutralising extremist threats—Bangladesh could emerge with a rejuvenated democracy, closing a dark chapter of one-party dominance. If he falters, however, the country risks a downward spiral of political violence, economic stagnation, and estrangement from the world. The stakes could not be higher: the “second liberation” that began with such hope in 2024 may either achieve a lasting democratic rebirth or degenerate into yet another cycle of turmoil. The world is watching, and 170 million Bangladeshis are waiting for a path ahead that leads to peace, pluralism, and prosperity.

References:

1. Rishi Gupta (2024). “Political Turmoil in Bangladesh: Hasina’s Fall, the Rise of an Interim Government, and Regional Dynamics.” Asia Society Policy Institute – Analysis, 28 August 2024.

2. Bawa Singh (2025). “A growing legitimacy crisis threatens Bangladesh’s fragile democracy.” The Indian Express (Opinion), 27 May 2025.

3. Mubashar Hasan (2025). “Why Did Bangladesh’s Interim Advisor Yunus Threaten to Resign?” The Diplomat, 26 May 2025.

4. Abdul Rahman (2025). “Interim government in Bangladesh faces growing popular anger and accusations of authoritarianism.” People’s Dispatch, 27 May 2025.

5. Wahiduzzaman Noor and Samantha Wong (2025). “Bangladesh may have ended its India-China tightrope game, but it must continue to tread carefully.” Atlantic Council – New Atlanticist Blog, 23 May 2025.

6. Julhas Alam (2023). “176 world leaders and Nobel laureates urge Bangladesh to halt legal cases against Peace Prize winner.” AP News, 28 August 2023.

7. Purav Thakur (2025). “Bring back Khilafat: Banned Islamist organisation marches in Bangladesh.” India Today, 8 March 2025.