When Dr. Muhammad Yunus returned to the centre stage of Bangladeshi politics as the head of an interim government in 2024, many hailed him as a messiah. A Nobel laureate, microfinance pioneer, and celebrated reformer, Yunus was seen by sections of civil society and the international community as the antidote to decades of state corruption, political dysfunction, and economic cronyism.
But less than a year into his leadership, troubling allegations suggest that the promise of a “clean slate” is fast becoming a mirage. Instead of dismantling the entrenched networks of power and privilege, critics argue that a new oligarchy is being built—centred on Yunus’s Grameen empire.
Grameen’s Free Ride: Tax Exemptions and Privileged Profits
Perhaps the most jarring aspect of the unfolding scandal is the apparent favouritism shown towards Grameen-affiliated businesses. It has been reported that the government wrote off approximately 600 million BDT in taxes owed by Grameen entities. Even more controversially, a blanket exemption from income tax for the next five years was granted to Yunus’s companies—including those reaping hundreds of millions of dollars in profits from foreign investment, profits allegedly being repatriated abroad without paying local taxes.
This isn’t merely about lost revenue. It’s about creating a parallel economic order—one where elite institutions can operate above the rules binding ordinary citizens and businesses.
A University for Himself, a Job for His Nephew
The consolidation of power and privilege doesn’t end with tax relief. The interim government recently approved the creation of a Grameen-branded university, which critics view as part of a legacy-building exercise by Yunus. Even more eyebrow-raising was the appointment of his nephew to a government position equivalent to that of a Deputy Secretary.
This reeks of nepotism, drawing stark parallels with the very dynastic politics Yunus had once critiqued. For a government promising to clean up the political house, these moves suggest that personal loyalty, rather than public merit, is the currency of influence.
Clean Slate or Elite Shield?
Beyond the optics of reform lies a disturbing narrative of selective justice. Several of Dr. Yunus’s advisors in the interim administration are facing serious allegations of accepting bribes from convicted or accused figures associated with the previous regime. If true, this implies a dangerous continuity—the same culture of corruption, repackaged in the language of reform.
Yunus himself had previously faced legal scrutiny over financial irregularities, including allegations of misappropriating employee welfare funds in Grameen Telecom. Although he was recently acquitted of these charges, the timing has drawn suspicion. Were these acquittals genuine judicial decisions, or the result of executive influence now that he holds power?
What Happened to the Promised Accountability?
The interim government launched several high-profile asset recovery campaigns, including plans to recover over $200 billion in wealth allegedly smuggled abroad by elites linked to the last government. Civil settlements are being proposed, which critics argue could allow the corrupt to pay for forgiveness, thereby undermining the moral authority of anti-corruption drives.
Ironically, while pursuing past tycoons, the government has turned a blind eye to conflicts of interest within its own ranks, especially those involving Grameen entities and Dr. Yunus’s personal network.
A Systemic Malaise or a Revolving Door?
In a recent Guardian interview, Yunus admitted that ordinary Bangladeshis see the government as the enemy:
“Somebody is always waiting to grab an enormous amount of money.”
He wasn’t wrong, but the irony is palpable. His own administration now stands accused of the very behaviour he decries.
The broader implication is stark: Bangladesh’s corruption problem is not limited to one party, regime, or institution—it’s systemic. And without bold structural reform of taxation, the judiciary, procurement, and party financing, it will continue to metastasise, regardless of who occupies the highest chair.
The Clock is Ticking: Towards an Election or Deeper Disillusionment?
The interim government has pledged to hold general elections by April 2026, promising a return to democratic rule. But the early signs suggest a repetition of the past—elite protectionism, suppression of dissent, and political maneuvering behind a facade of reform.
Unless there is a radical break from selective justice, and unless institutions like the Anti-Corruption Commission and the judiciary are empowered to investigate everyone—including the interim government’s own allies—the current regime risks being remembered not as a reformer’s revolution but as another chapter in the long saga of Bangladesh’s betrayal.
Final Thoughts: Was Toppling the Last Government Fruitless?
If Dr. Yunus’s rise was meant to signal hope, justice, and integrity, then the current trajectory is dangerously close to squandering that goodwill. By allegedly replicating the structures of corruption and privilege, the interim government may prove that toppling the last government was not a revolution—but a reshuffling of the same rotten deck.
A clean slate is only possible if those in power are willing to hold themselves accountable, not just their predecessors.
Until then, the Bangladeshi public watches—disillusioned, disappointed, and doubtful—once again.
