Bangladesh stands at a precarious crossroads, navigating a complex web of internal upheaval and external pressures. The ousting of long-time Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, following mass protests and her abrupt flight to India, led to the installation of an interim government headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. Now, what was announced as a necessary transition reveals troubling cracks—constitutional uncertainty, creeping militarisation, and international interference.
A Constitution Without a Compass
The current interim government’s legal footing is murky at best. The Constitution of Bangladesh provides no blueprint for a transitional authority of this kind, especially one not birthed through an election or parliamentary consensus. With the dissolution of the Jatiya Sangsad (national parliament), the new administration operates in a legal grey zone. Reform commissions have been launched under Yunus’s watch, ostensibly to repair the judiciary, civil service, and electoral system—but these efforts lack transparency, broad consultation, or a clear timeline for democratic return.
Critics see these commissions as cosmetic gestures, designed to buy time while consolidating control. The public, already jaded by years of political theatre, now watches as unelected elites shuffle power behind closed doors.
The Military Moves Closer to the Helm
General Waker-uz-Zaman, Bangladesh’s Army Chief, played a central role in engineering the fall of the Hasina regime. Since then, the army’s involvement in civil administration has only grown. Key ministries have quietly come under military-friendly leadership. Anti-terrorism laws have been used to ban the Awami League, raising eyebrows among legal scholars and political observers alike.
There is growing fear that this isn’t just about restoring order—it’s about a controlled power transfer. The line between civilian leadership and military command is blurring, fast.
A Corridor Wrapped in Complications
The interim government’s agreement to a UN-backed humanitarian corridor into Myanmar’s Rakhine State was supposed to be a neutral act of regional goodwill. In reality, it has exposed Bangladesh to immense geopolitical risk. The U.S. has championed the corridor under the BURMA Act, framing it as a humanitarian necessity. But opposition figures claim it’s a Trojan horse—an entry point for Western influence, potential CIA operations, and even covert support for the Arakan Army.
Critics worry that the corridor risks entangling Bangladesh in Myanmar’s civil conflict, potentially legitimising the military junta and opening Bangladesh to retaliation or regional backlash.
Caught Between Global Giants
Bangladesh risks alienating China and complicating ties with India by supporting the Rakhine corridor. Beijing has invested heavily in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, while Delhi views any U.S.-backed military activity near its northeastern border with suspicion. Bangladesh now finds itself stuck in a tug-of-war between superpowers, with little leverage and even less clarity.
If Yunus bows to Washington, Dhaka might lose Beijing. If he plays neutral, he could alienate the very West that props up his legitimacy.
Tensions at the Top: Yunus vs. the Generals?
Behind the scenes, it appears there’s a power struggle between Professor Yunus and General Zaman. What began as a united front is starting to unravel. Yunus wants democratic reforms. Zaman wants discipline and stability—on the army’s terms.
Sources suggest Yunus has been quietly resisting some of the army’s hardline policies, including mass detentions and the political blacklisting of dissenters. The military, in turn, sees Yunus as too idealistic, independent, and slow to act. The two reportedly avoid joint appearances, and their rhetoric increasingly reflects different visions for Bangladesh’s future.
Yunus insists his role is transitional, but Zaman has made no such commitment. Rumours swirl that the army is preparing its candidate-or perhaps Zaman himself-for long-term leadership.
Is the Military Plotting a Full Return to Power?
After 17 years of formal governance, signs point to the military preparing for a comeback. This time, it’s not with tanks in the streets but with boardroom takeovers, media narratives, and judicial influence. Military-linked think tanks now flood the airwaves with messaging about “disciplined democracy” and “security-first governance.”
Without credible civilian leadership, the army positions itself as the only force holding the nation together. With the Awami League out, BNP fragmented, and Islamist factions resurging, the door is wide open.
Regional geopolitics only strengthens this path. India may tolerate a military-led Bangladesh if it prevents Chinese encroachment. China, for its part, prefers predictable autocrats to wavering liberals. And the U.S.—as long as its humanitarian corridor is secured—may look the other way.
A Nation Betrayed Again?
The pattern is tragically familiar. Since its bloody birth in 1971, Bangladesh has never enjoyed sustained political stability. Each wave of hope—whether from liberation heroes, reformist generals, or civil society icons—has eventually drowned in power struggles, foreign manipulation, or institutional decay.
The current interim arrangement, cloaked in reformist language, may be the next chapter in this cycle of betrayal. What started as a people-powered movement has ended in elite manoeuvring, military muscle, and external agendas.
For the millions who sacrificed during the war of independence, this is a bitter pill. The dream of a democratic, sovereign, and just Bangladesh seems farther away than ever. What we are witnessing may not be a transition—it may be a transfer—one more silent coup in a country that can’t seem to outrun its ghosts.
